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The Greenspan conundrum of 2005-7 and the acceleration in US ABCP supply: a single 
‘reach for yield’ story. 
 
Photis Lysandrou and Mimoza Shabani 
Abstract 
The period 2005 through to mid-2007 saw a sharp acceleration in the rate of supply of US asset backed 
commercial paper (ABCP). This same period also saw the yield on 10-year US treasury bonds remain 
stubbornly below the federal funds rate, an event so unusual as to cause the then Chairman of the Federal 
reserve, Alan Greenspan, to talk of a bond yield ‘conundrum’. The central hypothesis of this paper is 
that these parallel developments were causally linked, with the reach for yield on the part of institutional 
investors being the key linking factor. To support this hypothesis, we use a dynamic system Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) model to estimate the relationship between US ABCP issuance in the pre-
crisis period and such determining factors as short term interest rates, the strength of demand for US 
ABCP from US institutional money market mutual funds (MMMFs), the geographical breakdown of 
the bank-sponsored conduits that were the principal suppliers of ABCP and conduit characteristics. 
 
JEL Classification: G20; G21 
Keywords: Greenspan conundrum; asset backed commercial paper; reach for yield 
 
1. Introduction 
To understand the financial crisis one must know why the shadow banking system had in the 
preceding period grown to a size large enough to wreak havoc in the regular banking sector 
when it seized up in the summer of 2007. As concerns the growth of the asset backed securities 
(ABSs) and collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), the long term securities issued by the 
shadow banking entities, there is now widespread acknowledgement that one of the principal 
driving forces behind this growth was the reach for yield on the part of institutional investors 
(see e.g. Cabellero,2009, 2010; Lysandrou, 2009, Bernanke, 2011;  Goda et.al, 2013, Goda and 
Lysandrou,2014). However, this is not the case as regards the growth in asset backed 
commercial paper (ABCP), the short term securities issued principally by the bank sponsored 
conduits. The dominant position here continues to be one that favours supply push factors over 
demand pull pressures, one of the main arguments being that many US and European 
commercial banks took advantage of the absence of any strong regulation covering off-balance 
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sheet vehicles and their activities to maximise profits through regulatory arbitrage (see e.g. 
Acharya and Schnabl,2010;  Acharya et.al., 2013;  Arteta et. al.,2013)1 
The problem with this type of argument is that it cannot satisfactorily account for a striking 
peculiarity in the pre-crisis growth rate of the US ABCP market. From its origins in the late 
1980s, the size of that market had grown steadily to reach about $600 billion by end-2004, at 
which point there was then a sudden acceleration in the rate of US ABCP issuance such that 
by the summer of 2007 the overall value of the market had almost doubled to $1.1 trillion, with 
bank-sponsored conduits accounting for about 75% of this amount. Why that acceleration at 
precisely that point in time? In our view, the most plausible answer is to be found in the 
behaviour of the federal funds rate. From 1% in June, 2004, that rate had risen to 4% by June, 
2005, and to 5.25% by June 2006 where it remained until the outbreak of the subprime crisis 
the following year. Given that throughout this two and a half year period the yield on 10 year-
Treasuries lay for much of the time below the policy rate, it stands to reason that institutional 
investors would have looked to short term securities as a supplementary means of satisfying 
their need for yield. The aim of this paper is to give empirical backing to this hypothesis.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section two explains how the reach for yield came to 
be the key driver behind the exceptionally rapid growth of the US ABCP market between 2005 
and 2007. Section three explains the data and the methodology that will be used to support this 
explanation. Section four provides some results. Section five provides a short summary.  
Section six concludes. 
 
2. The events surrounding the pre-crisis growth of the US ABCP market 
Our story is that the supply of US ABCP was rapidly expanded in 2005-7 principally in order 
to accommodate the excess demand for yield spilling over from the long term US bond markets. 
The story can be broken down into five parts. 
(i) From about 2001 onwards there was a pronounced decline in yields across all of the 
major ‘ground-floor’ US bond markets (treasury, municipal and corporate) caused primarily, 
                                                          
1 Although Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2010) provide a detailed analysis of the demand-side of the US ABCP 
market in the pre-crisis era they do not go so far as to give primacy to demand pull pressure in the pre-crisis 
growth of that market. They acknowledge the fact that “some observers argue that the growth of the asset-
backed commercial paper market was fuelled by demand from money market funds” (2010, p.36) but they do 
not specify who these observers are. 
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if not exclusively, by the exceptionally large inflows of funds from foreign private and foreign 
official investors (see appendix, figure 1A). To help accommodate these inflows the US 
banking system rapidly expanded the supply of ‘first-floor’ debt securities, principally 
securities backed by residential mortgage loans. It is noteworthy that of the $9 trillion US ABS 
outstanding in mid-2007, over one half of these securities had been created in the previous four 
years (Bank of England, 2007a).  Given that the increased rate of ABS supply was never going 
to be enough to fully satisfy foreign and domestic institutional demand for yield, as attested by 
the continuing fall in the ABS spread over US treasuries, the US banking system also began 
from around 2003 onwards to rapidly expand the supply of ‘second-floor’ debt securities, 
securities backed by securities backed by mortgage and other credit loans. From approximately 
$ 0.25 trillion in 2002, the US CDO market had grown twelvefold to $3 trillion by the summer 
of 2007 (Blundel-Wignall, 2007; IMF, 2008). It is noteworthy in this respect that while 
conforming (prime agency) mortgage loans constituted the majority part of the US mortgage 
market up to 2004, between 2005 and 2007 it was the non-conforming segment of this market 
(subprime, alt-A and jumbo) that became predominant (Bank of England, 2007b). 
(ii) The rapid expansion in both US conforming and non-conforming mortgage loans, 
the raw material needed for ABSs and cash CDOs, was to some degree facilitated by the easing 
of US monetary policy following the end of the dot.com boom. From 6.5% in late 2000, the 
federal funds rate fell to 1% in June 2003 where it remained until June 2004. However, just as 
the low short term interest rate period gave boost to mortgage lending, that boost in turn helped 
to usher in a period of high short term interests when the federal reserve, concerned about the 
possible inflationary consequences of increased consumer spending fuelled in part by the 
wealth effects of rising house prices, raised the federal funds rate by a quarter percent at a time 
in seventeen consecutive steps starting in June 2004. In preceding periods of monetary policy 
tightening, such as in 1988-9, 1994-5 and 1999-2000, the yield on 10-year Treasuries kept track 
with the target federal funds rate. On this occasion, however, it did not. When the policy rate 
fell by 5.5% between 2001and 2004 the yield on 10-year Treasuries fell by 3.57 %, from 6.77% 
to 3.2%; but what was more unusual is that while the policy rate rose by 4.25% to 5.25% 
between mid-2004 and mid-2007, the yield on 10-year Treasuries rose by only 2% over the 
same period, to 5.2%, a development that caused Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan 
Greenspan, to talk of a bond yield conundrum in his congressional testimony in February, 2005. 
Conundrum or not, the fact that the short term rate remained above the long term rate for much 
of the 2005-2007 period (see appendix, figure 2A) made it highly likely that institutional 
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investors would look to the short term securities market as a supplementary means of satisfying 
their need for yield. The clues that strongly indicate this to have been the case are to be found 
on both the demand side of the US ABCP market and on the supply side. 
 (iii) The demand side clue pertains to the US money market mutual funds (MMMFs) 
that first originated in the early 1970s. These basically divide into ‘government’ MMMFs (that 
invest solely in securities issued by the government and its agencies) and ‘prime’ MMMFs 
(that invest in private sector securities) and while the former group continued to account for 
the majority part of all MMMF asset holdings right up to end-2004, it was the latter group that 
took over this mantle between 2005 and 2007 (Kacperczyk and Schnabl, 2010). Prime MMMFs 
in turn divide into ‘retail’ and ‘institutional’ MMMFs, and while the former group remained 
the larger one in terms of asset holdings up to about 1999-2000, the situation was reversed 
thereafter (see appendix, figure 3A). It is noteworthy that the point at which institutional 
MMMFs became predominant is also exactly the point at which the overall size of US MMMF 
asset holdings begin to mirror short run interest rates: down when the rates were down in 2001-
2004, and sharply up when the rates were up between June 2004 and July, 2007 (see appendix, 
figure 4A). What is also noteworthy is that where prior to 2005 the composition of MMMF 
commercial paper asset holdings was heavily weighted towards financial and corporate 
commercial paper with ABCP comprising only a small part, over the next two and a half years 
the situation was reversed (Kacperczyk and Schnabl, 2010). The simple explanation for this 
reversal is that the banks and corporations needing to finance their borrowing requirements 
were reluctant to issue short term paper when the short term rate was prohibitively high and 
preferred instead to lock into the unusually low long term borrowing rates. By contrast, no such 
considerations constrained either the ability or the willingness of bank-sponsored conduits to 
increase the issuance of ABCP to make up for the shortfall in the supply of short term paper 
demanded by the MMMFs (see appendix, figure 5A). 
 (iv) The above observation brings us to the supply side clues pointing to the pre-crisis 
growth of the US ABCP market as a reach for yield story. The first of these concerns the 
geographical breakdown of the bank-sponsored conduits that accounted for approximately 
$750 billion out of the total $1.1 trillion of US ABCP outstanding in mid-2007. Of this $750 
billion, European banks accounted for about $460 billion, US banks for about $270 billion and 
Japanese banks for the small remainder (see appendix, figure 6A). Taken individually, no 
European country’s banks, not even those of Germany, could quite match those of the US in 
terms of the percentage share of US ABCP supply. This said, it is nevertheless remarkable that 
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the aggregate percentage share of the European banks should have been substantially above 
that of the US banks when we consider that the contemporaneous European contribution to 
supplies of ABSs and CDOs was almost negligible: of the $ 11 trillion ABSs and $3 trillion 
CDOs outstanding in mid-2007 the European banking sector accounted for a mere 17% of both 
amounts (Bertaut et.al, 2012). Just as remarkable as the European dominance of the US ABCP 
market in the pre-crisis period is the speed with which this dominance was established. Up to 
2001 the European banks’ share of this market remained below that of the US banks and while 
this share then increased above that of the latter between mid-2001 and mid-2005, the rate of 
this increase remained fairly steady so that from about $230 billion at the start of this four year 
period the European banks’ share only reached about $ 280 billion by the end of it. However, 
everything abruptly changed in the following two year period up to mid-2007 when it was the 
European bank sponsored conduits that took the lead in collectively powering the steep rise in 
US ABCP issuance with the result that their share of that market rose from $280 billion to $460 
billion. One possible reason for the discrepancy between the European banks’ minor 
contribution to ABS and CDO issuance, on the one hand, and their major contribution to ABCP 
issuance, on the other, are the very different construction requirements needed by these 
different types of debt securities. The short term and typically non-tradable nature of ABCP 
means that these instruments are relatively easy to construct as compared with ABSs that, as 
long term instruments, require more paperwork if they are to be capable of being traded away 
from the initial conditions of issuance. The difference in technical difficulty and complexity is 
even pronounced in the case of CDOs given that the inclusion of securitised subprime mortgage 
loans in the mixture of backing collateral entails the use of sophisticated credit enhancement 
techniques (CETs) to make these products in any way viable as investable assets. Thus when 
the institutional demand for short term paper began to expand rapidly from early 2005, the 
European banks were well able to join with their US counterparts in accommodating this 
expansion  
 (v) A further supply side clue pointing to the primacy of this yield pull pressure in the 
pre-crisis growth of the US ABCP market concerns the programme breakdown of the market. 
These programmes broadly divide into those where credit loans form the major collateral 
behind ABCP issuance, the principal ones being multi-seller, single seller and loan-backed 
programmes, and those where securities are the major backing collateral, the principal 
programmes here being securities arbitrage, hybrid (that combine multi-seller and securities 
arbitrage characteristics) and SIV. It is noteworthy that where in mid-2001 the three major 
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credit loan backed programmes accounted for 77.1% of all ABCP outstanding at that point, 
by mid-2007 their percentage share had fallen to 62.8% while the share of the three major 
securities backed programmes rose from 21.3% to 32.8% over the same period (Ahern, 
2007). This development in a sense mirrored what was happening at the same time in the 
CDO market.  Despite the high rate of supply of cash CDOs after 2002, this rate was still not 
enough to satisfy the rapid rise in demand for yield, which is why from about 2004 it was 
synthetic CDOs that became the dominant component of total CDO stocks ($2 trillion out of 
$3 trillion by mid-2007).  Unlike cash CDOs that take months to be created because they 
require the physical involvement of household borrowers and of the commercial banks that 
lend to them in their creation, synthetic CDOs take only a few days to be established in that 
they involve nothing other than the use of credit default swaps.  A similar situation appeared 
to arise in the ABCP market from about mid-2005 in that while the loan backed programmes 
continued to carry the major burden of ABCP supply, the high rate of demand for these 
products combined with the limits to the amounts of loans that could be mustered as 
collateral in the time needed meant that securities backed programmes, which could be 
launched more quickly, had to be called upon to help carry the burden.  
This explanation as to why European bank sponsored conduits continued their purchases of 
US ABS in the period 2005-2007 differs markedly from that given by Bertaut et.al. (2012). In 
their version of events in this period they start with the observation that “the factors that 
explain European interest in ABS were likely similar to those motivating investors in the 
United States”, chief amongst these factors being the triple-A rating of ABS that made these 
assets appear “very safe, while offering slightly higher returns that Treasuries and Agencies” 
(2012, p.224). Bertaut et.al. then go on to make the assumption that the factors motivating 
Europeans to purchase ABS in the 2002-2004 period continued to be the primary motivating 
factors behind European purchases of ABS in the 2005-2007 period. Faced with the question 
as to why the Europeans would continue to purchase ABS at a time when the profit 
opportunities from funding these purchases with ABCP had diminished so greatly, their 
answer is that, having first gathered pace in the 2002-2004 period, the European demand for 
ABS then acquired a momentum of its own for a number of reasons including (i) the 
possibility that house price appreciation had held down delinquencies on subprime mortgages 
thus allowing ABS to maintain a record of dependability and an illusion of safety, (ii) the 
possibility that low yields on other assets had reduced the incentives for investors to switch 
from ABS to these other assets and (iii) more generally,  the possibility that a culture of risk 
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taking had developed amongst European banks, as amongst their US counterparts, that 
centred importantly around securitisation (2012, p.224). 
In our view, this line of argument does not appear to square with the facts. In the first place, 
the European banks’ motive for buying ABS with ABCP funding in the 2002-2004 period 
appears to differ from that of the US banks in that the latter’s rate of supply of ABCP ( partly 
backed by ABS) actually declined in this period while the former’s rate of supply remained 
modestly positive (see appendix, figure 7A): it would appear that over this period the US 
banks were more sensitive to the MMMF’s rate of demand for ABCP, which was then 
negative, while the European banks were less sensitive to this demand and more concerned 
with exploiting the profit opportunities offered by the differential between long and short 
term yields. In the second place, there is the question concerning the European banks’ rate of 
acquisition of US ABS over the 2002 to 2007 period. If the ‘momentum’ argument is correct, 
we should have seen this rate of acquisition slow down while remaining positive in the sub-
period 2005-7 or, at the very least, be maintained at roughly the same average level as was 
maintained in the earlier sub-period of 2002-2004. In fact the contrary was the case, for as 
shown in figure 7A in the appendix (a figure reproduced from Bertaut et.al (2012)), the rate 
of European banks’ acquisition of ABS accelerated sharply in the 2005-2007 period, so much 
so that average European holdings of these assets in this period were double their holdings in 
the 2002-2004 period. This acceleration in European ABS purchases taken in conjunction 
with the acceleration in the European rate of ABCP supply over the same 2005-2007 period 
(as shown in figure 6A) suggests that there was a structural break in the European motives for 
buying ABS that occurred around end- 2004: in the 2002-2004 period, Europeans may have 
been supplying APCP to fund their purchases of ABS, but in the 2005-2007 bond yield 
conundrum period it was the other way round: Europeans were by that time buying ABS  to 
use as collateral in creating ABCP. 
To summarise, the bond yield conundrum of 2005-7 and the corresponding acceleration in the 
rate of US ABCP supply over the same time span are not two different stories but two sides 
of the same reach for yield story. Others have attempted to estimate the contribution of yield 
pull pressure to the bond yield conundrum (see Goda et.al., 2013, for an overview of the 
literature). By contrast, there has to our knowledge been no systematic attempt to estimate the 
contribution of yield pull pressure to the rate of US ABCP issuance in the conundrum period. 
Thus what follows is the first time that such an attempt has been mounted.  
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3. Data and Methodology. 
 
We use a dynamic system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) two-step first difference 
model (Arellano and Bond, 1991) to estimate the relationship between ABCP issued in the 
US market and such determining factors as the federal funds rate, MMMF asset holdings, the 
geographical breakdown of the banks sponsoring ABCP conduits and differences in conduit 
characteristics.  More formally the baseline econometric model is:  
 
(1)  𝐴𝐵𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0𝐴𝐵𝐶𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 𝜃 +  𝛾𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡   (1) 
 
The dependent variable ABCP is the average outstanding commercial paper issued in 
the US market by conduit i, i=1….325, at time t, t=2001q2…..2007q2.   MMMF is the log of 
total financial assets held by MMMF. Interest rate is the effective Federal Funds Rate, (Fed 
rate).  𝑋𝑖,𝑡  is a vector that contains information of the different types of conduits. Dummy 
variables were constructed for each type of programs for which the value of one is given to a 
representative type and zero otherwise. The programs included are: multiseller, securities 
arbitrage, hybrid, SIV, Repos/TRS, loan-backed, CDO and fully sponsored. Single seller and 
other types of programs are the omitted group.  𝛾𝑖 is the unobserved  fixed effect that accounts 
for time invariant conduit-specific features.  GMM estimation methodology eliminates the 
fixed effect by first differencing variables and corrects for all sources of endogeneity between 
the dependent and independent variables by using as instruments lagged differences of the 
dependent variable and lagged levels of independent variables. Standard errors are corrected 
for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). 
 
 Following the initial specification of the model, where we take total MMMF assets, we 
modify it to so as to separate institutional MMMF assets from retail MMMF assets.  We 
further modify the model to include a dummy variable that separates out conduits that are 
sponsored by European banks.  The dummy variable takes the value of one if the sponsoring 
bank is headquartered in Europe and zero otherwise.   
 
 
We also run a second model that takes into account the bond yield conundrum outlined 
above: 
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(2)   𝐴𝐵𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0𝐴𝐵𝐶𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 𝜃 +  𝛾𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (2) 
 
Where Yield Spread is the difference between the effective Federal Funds rate and the 10-
year Treasury yield rate.  
 
We use a panel dataset of ABCP issuance obtained from Moody’s Investor Service quarterly 
information on all active conduits2. Our dataset consists of all bank sponsored conduits that 
have issued ABCP in the US market for the period between 2001q2-2007q2. We exclude all 
conduits that have not issued in the US market.  The information obtained from Moody’s 
Investor Service concerns conduit characteristics and sponsor details. The characteristics 
include credit support type (fully or partially sponsored) and program type. Only bank 
sponsored conduits are included in our sample. 
 
To construct our dataset we assign an id number to each conduit by name. Any two conduits 
that have the same name and that have issued in the same quarter are treated as different 
conduits.  We include not only conduits that have issued in all consecutive quarters for the 
period between 2001-2007 but also those that have issued in only a few quarters.  
Furthermore, the dataset includes those conduits that according to Moody’s issue ABCP in 
the US market but have issued zero ABCP in a particular quarter. In other words, any conduit 
that has issued in at least one quarter covered in our time span is included in our sample.   
 
In order to distinguish European conduits from non-European ones the bank sponsor location 
is used. Bankscope is used to identify the headquarter location of each bank.  There are a total 
of 325 bank sponsored conduits in our sample: 156 European, 135 US, 16 Canadian, 12 
Japanese and 6 Australian (See appendix Table 1A)    
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 Moody’s Investors Services published quarterly spreadsheets, Program Index, which contains information on 
conduits rated by Moody.  
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4.Results 
 
The results of our benchmark model are shown in Table 1, column 1. The interest rate 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant suggesting that an increase in the federal 
fund rate increases outstanding ABCP by about $102 million. The MMMF coefficient is also 
positive and significant implying that a 1 % increase in MMMF asset holdings increases the 
issuance of ABPC by about $1.1 billion. In the second column we add the European bank 
sponsored dummy variable. As shown, the coefficient of this variable is positive and strongly 
significant, which is in accordance with our hypothesis that European conduits were the 
major drivers of ABCP growth in the sample period each issuing  on average $75 million 
more than a non-European conduit. In the third column the MMMF category is split into the 
institutional and retail subcategories while the forth column again includes the European 
banks sponsored dummy variable. As can be seen in both columns, it is institutional MMMFs 
that were responsible for this positive relation while retail MMMF asset holdings over the 
sample period were negatively related to average ABCP issuance. Furthermore, looking at the 
program types, the results suggest that SIV, securities arbitrage, multiseller3, hybrid and 
Repos/TRS are all positively related to ABCP issuance.  In other words, all these types of 
programs issued more than single seller and other type programs. The coefficient associated 
with SIV type conduit is by far the largest out of all, which is in the range of 15.811 and 
8.823.  The coefficient associated with Repos/ TRS on the other hand has the least magnitude 
than the other programs.  Loan-backed programs and CDO programs are negatively related 
with average ABCP outstanding for the period 2001q2-2007q2.  Finally, Table 1 shows that a 
program that is fully sponsored issues more ABCP than a program that is partially sponsored.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 The time invariant dummy variables (i.e. multiseller programs) have been interacted with a linear 
time trend (in this case the interaction with TR is included in the Tables). This is to overcome the 
issue of including time constant variables in a fixed-effect panel estimations (Wooldridge 2009). 
Therefore, the estimated coefficient for these interacted dummies is interpreted as a change overtime.  
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Table 1: ABCP average outstanding in the US market by program type, location, MMMF and 
short term rates , 2001Q2-2007Q2 
 
 
Table 2 presents the results when we run the same baseline model and specification for two 
sub-periods: 2001q1-2005q2 and 2005q2-2007q2.  Note that for the first sub-period the 
interest rate and MMMF coefficients are negative but then become positive for the second 
sub-period, 2005q2-2007q2, with institutional MMMFs being responsible for the positive 
MMMF coefficient. Note also the particularly strong contribution of the securities arbitrage, 
multiseller and hybrid programmes to US ABCP growth in the second sub-period.  
 
 
Dependent variable 
ABCP outstanding  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ABCP(-1) 0.720*** 
(0.000) 
0.692*** 
(0.000) 
0.706*** 
(0.000) 
0.733*** 
(0.000) 
Fed Rate 0.102*** 
(0.000) 
0.011*** 
(0.000) 
0.110*** 
(0.000) 
0.058*** 
(0.000) 
log(MMMF) 1.154*** 
(0.000) 
1.416*** 
(0.001) 
  
log(Institutional)   2.437*** 
(0.003) 
1.514*** 
(0.000) 
log(Retail)   -1.298*** 
(0.002) 
-0.566*** 
(0.001) 
Sec.Arbitrage 7.141*** 
(0.033) 
7.460*** 
(0.028) 
7.142*** 
(0.036) 
5.627*** 
(0.026) 
SIV 15.811*** 
(0.037) 
10.843*** 
(0.042) 
12.802*** 
(0.045) 
8.823*** 
(0.027) 
Repos/TRS 0.604*** 
(0.163) 
0.070 
(0.108) 
0.101 
(0.126) 
0.941*** 
(0.156) 
Multiseller*TR 3.759*** 
(0.032) 
2.446*** 
(0.027) 
2.331*** 
(0.032) 
2.976*** 
(0.026) 
Loan-Backed -1.529*** 
(0.002) 
-2.425*** 
(0.003) 
-2.556*** 
(0.004) 
-1.909*** 
(0.001) 
Hybrid 2.623*** 
(0.032) 
2.611*** 
(0.027) 
1.947*** 
(0.032) 
3.627*** 
(0.026) 
CDO -0.010 
(0.006) 
0.240*** 
(0.013) 
-0.365*** 
(0.040) 
-2.048*** 
(0.002) 
Full 1.242*** 
(0.003) 
1.334*** 
(0.008) 
1.174*** 
(0.009) 
2.027*** 
(0.002) 
European  0.075*** 
(0.000) 
 0.024*** 
(0.000) 
Observations 4229 4229 4229 4229 
AR(2) 0.556 0.118 0.552 0.228 
Prob(J-statistic) 0.404 0.401 0.441 0.501 
NOTES: ***,**,* represents 1, 5 and 10% significance level respectively. The dependent variable 
is average ABCP outstanding in $ billion.  Robust Standard Error in parenthesis.  All estimators 
are based on the Arellano and Bond (1991) two- step GMM estimator. Program type includes 
multi-sellers, securities arbitrage, SIV, REPOS/TRS, Loan -Backed, Hybrid and CDO. Other 
types of program and single-seller are the omitted group.  
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Table 2: ABCP average outstanding in the US market by program type, location, MMMF and 
short term rates, 2005Q2-2007Q2 
 
 
 
Table 3 shows the results of model (2) in which interest rate spreads replace the federal funds 
rate variable. We estimate the model over the 2001q2-2007q2 time period as well as for two 
sub-periods namely 2001q2-2005q2 and 2005q2-2007q2. The coefficient of yield spread for 
the whole sample period is positive and equal to 0.113. This implies that as the spread widens 
the issuance of ABCP increases by nearly $113 million.  The results for the other two sub-
 
Dependent variable 
ABCP outstanding  
2001Q2-2005Q2 2005Q2-2007Q2 2001Q2-2005Q2 2005Q2-2007Q2 
ABCP(-1) 0.602*** 
(0.000) 
0.671*** 
(0.000) 
0.803*** 
(0.002) 
0.691***  
(0.000) 
Fed Rate -0.109*** 
(0.006) 
0.174*** 
(0.000) 
-0.007*** 
(0.011) 
0.035*** 
(0.001) 
log(MMMF) -0.900*** 
(0.068) 
0.679*** 
(0.005) 
  
log(Institutional)   0.692*** 
(0.211) 
8.107*** 
(0.020) 
log(Retail)   -0.021*** 
(0.113) 
-7.540*** 
(0.019) 
Sec.Arbitrage -4.779* 
(2.590) 
7.308*** 
(0.011) 
-9.590*** 
(2.033) 
8.583*** 
(0.039) 
SIV*TR -0.449 
(2.597) 
-0.199*** 
(0.002) 
-3.385 
(2.851) 
-0.270*** 
(0.001) 
Repos/TRS  1.453*** 
(0.040) 
 9.866** 
(0.112) 
Multiseller -6.754*** 
(2.429) 
5.662*** 
(0.098) 
--3.107*** 
(1.118) 
5.602*** 
(0.135) 
Loan-Backed*TR -2.644*** 
(0.129) 
1.709*** 
(0.264) 
-1.140*** 
(0.102) 
0.999*** 
(0.154) 
Hybrid -10.431*** 
(2.462) 
5.140*** 
(0.102) 
-6.248*** 
(1.161) 
2.031*** 
(0.130) 
CDO -5.873 
(8.338) 
0.239*** 
(0.028) 
5.574 
(9.832) 
2.031*** 
(0.130) 
Full 13.055*** 
(3.153) 
1.384*** 
(0.007) 
0.525*** 
(6.576) 
1.376*** 
(0.043) 
Observations 2931 1447 2931 1408 
AR(2) 0.251 0.899 0.328 0.983 
Prob(J-statistic) 0.534 0.444 0.520 0.361 
NOTES: ***,**,* represents 1, 5 and 10% significance level respectively. The dependent variable 
is average ABCP outstanding in $ billion.  Robust Standard Error in parenthesis.  All 
estimators are based on the Arellano and Bond (1991) two-step GMM estimator. Program type 
includes multi-sellers, securities arbitrage, SIV, REPOS/TRS, loan backed, hybrid and CDO. 
Other types of program and single-seller are the omitted group. SIV*TR applies to the 2001-
2005 time span. Loan-Backed*TR applies to both sub-periods.  There are no Repos/TRS 
programs in the period 2001q2-2005q2.   
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periods are in line with the findings in model (1). In the period 2001-2005 the yield spread 
and MMMF demand for ABCP are negatively related to ABCP issuance as expected. By 
contrast, the yield spread and MMMF demand are positively related to ABCP issuance in the 
period 2005-2007, which is in line with our argument concerning the direct link between the 
bond yield conundrum and investor search for yield. The results for all other control variables 
are the same as in model (1), which is a clear indication that the results are robust. 
 
Table 3. ABCP average outstanding in the US market by program type, yield spread and 
MMMF, 2001Q2-2007Q2 
 
 
 
Dependent 
variable ABCP 
outstanding  
2001Q2-
2007Q2 
2001Q2-
2007Q2 
2001Q2-
2005Q2 
2001Q2 
2005Q2 
2005Q2-
2007Q2 
2005Q2-
2007Q2 
ABCP(-1) 0.723*** 
(0.000) 
0.736*** 
(0.000) 
0.604*** 
(0.002) 
0.804*** 
(0.002) 
0.676*** 
(0.000) 
0.676*** 
(0.000) 
Yield spread 0.113*** 
(0.000) 
0.078*** 
(0.000) 
-0.063*** 
(0.003) 
-0.034*** 
(0.006) 
0.168*** 
(0.001) 
0.053*** 
(0.001) 
log(MMMF) 1.215*** 
(0.001) 
 -0.543*** 
(0.059) 
 0.977*** 
(0.004) 
 
log(Institutional)  2.223*** 
(0.002) 
 2.914*** 
(0.184) 
 7.877*** 
(0.023) 
log(Retail)  -0.721*** 
(0.002) 
 -1.9111*** 
(0.111) 
 -7.059 
(0.022) 
Sec.Arbitrage 7.127*** 
(0.050) 
7.020*** 
(0.038) 
-3.763* 
(2.003) 
-7.467** 
(3.003) 
7.305*** 
(0.008) 
9.119*** 
(0.317) 
SIV 14.679*** 
(0.053) 
8.049*** 
(0.042) 
1.922 
(2.039) 
-4.822 
(3.097) 
-0.192*** 
(0.002) 
-0.232*** 
(0.001) 
Repos/TRS 0.677*** 
(0.199) 
1.317*** 
(0.158) 
  1.436*** 
(0.076) 
10.437*** 
(0.823) 
Multiseller 3.774*** 
(0.050) 
2.563*** 
(0.038) 
-6.002*** 
(1.871) 
-9.023*** 
(2.960) 
5.768*** 
(0.038) 
6.239*** 
(0.320) 
Loan-backed  -1.607*** 
(0.002) 
-1.919*** 
(0.002) 
-2.322*** 
(0.106) 
-3.071*** 
(0.201) 
1.860*** 
(0.188) 
1.138*** 
(0.122) 
Hybrid  2.703*** 
(0.050) 
3.181*** 
(0.038) 
-10.018*** 
(1.898) 
-12.840*** 
(2.954) 
5.199*** 
(0.037) 
2.741*** 
(0.320) 
CDO -0.072*** 
(0.008) 
-1.580*** 
(0.043) 
-3.299 
(6.450) 
-1.648 
(3.135) 
0.066*** 
(0.015) 
0.737*** 
(0.012) 
Full 1.256*** 
(0.006) 
1.397*** 
(0.007) 
13.346*** 
(3.210) 
13.970*** 
(3.132) 
1.377*** 
(0.017) 
1.559*** 
(0.021) 
Observations 4229 3872 2931 2931 1447 1447 
AR(2) 0.733 0.568 0.582 0.147 0.888 0.888 
Prob(J-statistic) 0.373 0.328 0.505 0.412 0.458 0.446 
NOTES: ***,**,* represents 1, 5 and 10% significance level respectively. The dependent 
variable is average ABCP outstanding in $ billion.  Robust Standard Error in 
parenthesis.  All estimators are based on the Arellano and Bond (1991) two-step GMM 
estimator. Program type includes multi-sellers, securities arbitrage, SIV, REPOS/TRS, 
loan backed, hybrid and CDO. Other types of program and single-seller are the omitted 
group.  There are no Repos/TRS programs in the period 2001q2-2005q2.   
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Table 4 shows the results of the same GMM estimation taking only the ABCP outstanding 
related to US bank based sponsored conduits for the whole period of 2001q2-2007q2, and 
then for the two sub-periods, 2001q2-2005q2 and 2005q2-2007q2. The first and the second 
columns show that while the MMMF and interests rate coefficients are in line with the 
findings above the same cannot be observed for the other variables. Nearly all the coefficients 
associated with programme type are negatively correlated with ABCP issuance, with the 
exception of the SIV coefficient, which is positive and very large.  Looking at the second 
sub-period of 2005q2-2007q2, the institutional MMMF coefficient is positive and significant 
while the retail MMMF coefficient is positive but less significant. However the coefficients 
of all conduit programs are negative in the period 2005q2-2007q2, except for CDO program 
types. This could be explained by the fact that US banks were able to sponsor CDO type 
programs, a finding that is in line with our reasoning explained above.   
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Table 4: US bank sponsored conduits ABCP average outstanding by program type 
 
 
 
Table 5 shows the results of the GMM estimation taking only the ABCP outstanding related 
to European bank based sponsored conduits for the whole period of 2001q2-2007q2, and then 
for the two sub-periods, 2001q2-2005q2 and 2005q2-2007q2. Two things become clear when 
we compare these results with those of table 4: first, that the European bank sponsored 
conduits were by far the more responsive to institutional MMMF demand for ABCP in the 
2005 to 2007 period as compared with the US bank sponsored conduits, and second, that the 
European response was particularly concentrated on the securities arbitrage, multi-seller and 
 
Dependent variable 
ABCP outstanding  
2001Q2-
2007Q2 
2001Q2-
2007Q2 
2001Q2-
2005Q2 
2001Q2 
2005Q2 
2005Q2-
2007Q2 
2005Q2-
2007Q2 
ABCP(-1) 0.659*** 
(0.000) 
0.656*** 
(0.000) 
0.433*** 
(0.000) 
0.436*** 
(0.000) 
0.746*** 
(0.001) 
0.749*** 
(0.002) 
Fed Rate 0.108*** 
(0.001) 
0.089*** 
(0.000) 
0.149*** 
(0.001) 
0.227*** 
(0.001) 
-0.021*** 
(0.002) 
-0.141*** 
(0.007) 
log(MMMF) 1.470*** 
(0.007) 
 0.870*** 
(0.005) 
 2.097*** 
(0.038) 
 
log(Institutional)  0.366*** 
(0.013) 
 2.612*** 
(0.012) 
 8.827*** 
(0.164) 
log(Retail)  1.653*** 
(0.005) 
 0.092*** 
(0.007) 
 -7.996*** 
(0.132) 
Sec.Arbitrage -3.437*** 
(0.516) 
-2.793*** 
(0.583) 
-18.092*** 
(0.497) 
-18.081*** 
(0.538) 
-7.350*** 
(0.919) 
-6.804*** 
(0.180) 
SIV*TR 28.846*** 
(0.879) 
30.508*** 
(0.677) 
0.859*** 
(0.034) 
1.036*** 
(0.027) 
-0.305*** 
(0.022) 
-0.301*** 
(0.031) 
Repos/TRS -0.037 
(1.165) 
-0.049 
(0.869) 
- - -6.841 
(1.115) 
-6.431 
(1.277) 
Multiseller  -2.610*** 
(0.109) 
-2.141*** 
(0.089) 
7.163*** 
(0.122) 
7.277*** 
(0.292) 
-8.137 
(1.090) 
-7.650*** 
(1.003) 
Loan-backed*TR  -0.220*** 
(0.001) 
0.008*** 
(0.001) 
0.153*** 
(0.001) 
0.183*** 
(0.002) 
-0.089 
(0.137) 
-0.198** 
(0.098) 
Hybrid*TR -0.158*** 
(0.002) 
-0.135*** 
(0.003) 
0.248*** 
(0.006) 
0.271*** 
(0.008) 
-0.297*** 
(0.031) 
-0.270*** 
(0.010) 
CDO 4.964 
(1.066) 
4.811 
(0.687) 
2.450 
(0.571) 
0.161 
90.119) 
0.106 
(0.555) 
0.494* 
(0.290) 
FULL*TR -0.099** 
(1.001) 
-0.061*** 
(0.001) 
-0.407*** 
(0.01) 
-0.382*** 
(0.001) 
0.020*** 
(0.001) 
0.023*** 
(0.001) 
Observations 1506 1506 1076 1076 481 481 
AR(2) 0.976 0.942 0.950 0.933 0.992 0.978 
Prob(J-statistic) 0.508 0.449 0.332 0.365 0.520 0.514 
NOTES: ***,**,* represents 1, 5 and 10% significance level respectively. The dependent variable 
is average ABCP outstanding in $ billion.  Robust Standard Error in parenthesis.  All estimators 
are based on the Arellano and Bond (1991) two-step GMM estimator. Program type includes 
multi-sellers, securities arbitrage, SIV, REPOS/TRS, loan backed, hybrid and CDO. Other types 
of program and single-seller are the omitted group. Loan-backed*TR, Hybrid*TR, and Full*TR 
applies to all sub-periods.  SIV*TR applies to the sub-periods 2001-2005 and 2005-2007. There 
are no Repos/TRS and CDO programs in the period 2001q2-2005q2.   
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hybrid programmes.  These results are consistent without conjecture that there was an 
acceleration in European demand for ABS over the bond yield conundrum period principally 
in order to use as collateral in ABCP issuance to meet institutional MMMF demand.   
 
Table 5.  European bank sponsored conduits ABCP average outstanding by program type 
 
 
6.Summary 
The results presented above are broadly consistent with our conjecture that the driving force 
behind the acceleration in US ABCP supply in the Greenspan conundrum period of 2005-7 
was the reach for yield pressure spilling over from the long term US bond markets. First, 
there is the timing of the acceleration: the jump in demand for ABCP from institutional 
MMMFs occurs exactly during the conundrum period; second, there is the geographic 
 
Dependent variable 
ABCP outstanding  
2001Q2-
2007Q2 
2001Q2-
2007Q2 
2001Q2-
2005Q2 
2001Q2 
2005Q2 
2005Q2-
2007Q2 
2005Q2-
2007Q2 
ABCP(-1) 0.287*** 
(0.003) 
0.821*** 
(0.000) 
0.685*** 
(0.000) 
0.209*** 
(0.012) 
0.066* 
(0.038) 
0.329*** 
(0.011) 
Fed Rate 0.087*** 
(0.007) 
0.076*** 
(0.000) 
-0.149*** 
(0.001) 
0.123*** 
(0.030) 
0.440*** 
(0.067) 
0.188*** 
(0.024) 
log(MMMF) 4.950*** 
(0.110) 
 -1.008*** 
(0.009) 
 2.915*** 
(0.635) 
 
log(Institutional)  1.163*** 
(0.013) 
 6.810*** 
(0.786) 
 13.753*** 
(0.802) 
log(Retail)  -0.118*** 
(0.006) 
 -3.525*** 
(0.508) 
 -10.762*** 
(0.759) 
Sec.Arbitrage 7.412*** 
(0.497) 
7.424*** 
(0.058) 
-3.212*** 
(0.072) 
-8.506 
(6.037) 
10.561*** 
(2.693) 
10.723*** 
(0.530) 
SIV 2.141 
(2.675) 
6.996*** 
(0.103) 
-2.613*** 
(0.082) 
-16.090* 
(8.930) 
-0.595* 
(0.348) 
-1.394*** 
(0.156) 
Repos/TRS 4.777*** 
(1.332) 
0.421 
(0.378) 
- - 8.835 
(6.564) 
0.383 
(0.060) 
Multiseller  6.228*** 
(0.675) 
2.602*** 
(0.055) 
-2.978*** 
(0.073) 
-11.363** 
(5.404) 
4.085 
(4.817) 
13.276*** 
(1.161) 
Loan-backed  -1.891*** 
(0.144) 
-0.885*** 
(0.005) 
-1.930*** 
(0.010) 
-5.828*** 
(1.118) 
  
Hybrid  18.067*** 
(0.784) 
2.072*** 
(0.059) 
-3.888*** 
(0.071) 
-8.415 
(6.217) 
7.971* 
(4.754) 
11.583*** 
(1.509) 
CDO -0.104 
(0.540) 
-1.078 
(1.438) 
- - -0.589 
(1427) 
-0.710 
(0.650) 
Full 5.061** 
(1.015) 
1.956*** 
(0.009) 
(12.722)*** 
(0.229) 
4.775 
(4.705) 
- - 
Observations 2089 2089 1404 1404 763 763 
AR(2) 0.858 0.929 0.493 0.163 0.320 0.889 
Prob(J-statistic) 0.404 0.515 0.518 0.327 0.572 0.108 
NOTES: ***,**,* represents 1, 5 and 10% significance level respectively. The dependent variable is 
average ABCP outstanding in $ billion.  Robust Standard Error in parenthesis.  All estimators are 
based on the Arellano and Bond (1991) two-step GMM estimator. Program type includes multi-
sellers, securities arbitrage, SIV, REPOS/TRS, loan backed, hybrid and CDO. Other types of 
program and single-seller are the omitted group. There are no Repos/TRS and CDO programs in the 
period 2001q2-2005q2.   
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breakdown of the conduits involved in the acceleration: it was the European bank-sponsored 
conduits that accounted for the bulk of the increased supply of ABCO during the conundrum 
period; third, there is the change in the ABCP programme breakdown of the conduits: it was 
the securities backed programmes that increased their percentage share of total US ABCP 
supply during the conundrum period. 
The above results by no means contradict the argument that the banks sponsoring the 
conduits had both the opportunity (the exploitation of lax bank regulation) and the incentive 
(the exploitation of maturity mismatches) to boost their supply of US ABCP during the 
conundrum period. However, what the results do call into question is the much stronger 
argument that profit seeking activities on the part of the banks continued to be the primary 
driving force behind ABCP supply right up to the outbreak of the subprime crisis in the 
summer of 2007. If this was the case then why did the sudden acceleration in ABCP supply 
not occur before June 2004 when the yield differential between long and short term US 
securities was substantially higher thus offering substantially greater profit opportunities for 
the banks? Why did the European banks, who always found it much easier to issue ABCP as 
compared with ABSs and CDOs, wait until after June 2004 to boost their supply of this 
paper?  And why was it that the percentage share of securities backed ABCP programmes, as 
distinct from credit loan backed programmes, only rose substantially after June 2004 and not 
before this date?  
Our suggested answer to all of these questions is that the banks could not increase their rate 
of ABCP supply before June 2004, and thus did not need to depend more heavily on 
securities backed programmes to overcome the limits on credit loan backed programmes, 
simply because at that time there was no corresponding increase in the level of ABCP 
demand from MMMFs. On the contrary, the same set of circumstances offering banks the 
opportunity to profit handsomely from expanding ABCP supply before June 2004 were also 
precisely those deterring MMMFs from redirecting their demand for short term commercial 
paper away from other types of paper and towards ABCP. In sum, the unusually rapid growth 
of the US ABCP market during the conundrum period makes sense only if causal primacy for 
this growth is given to demand pull pressures with supply push considerations given a 
supporting enabling role. 
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6.Conclusion  
In light of the severity of the financial crisis of 2007-8 and the enormous damage 
subsequently done to the global economy, it is imperative that we have a full understanding 
the root causes of the crisis. That point has yet to be reached. While many gaps in our 
understanding have been filled, some still remain. One is the absence of a satisfactory 
explanation as to why the ABCP market, a key component of the shadow banking system in 
the pre-crisis period, experienced unusually rapid growth in the short time span between 2005 
and 2007. The present paper has sought to provide such an explanation. 
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Appendix 
Figure 1A 
 US Bond Yields, 1990-2007 
 
Source: Goda et.al (2013) 
 
Figure 2A  
Long and short term interst rates in the US (1990-2007) 
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Figure 3A 
MMMF Assets in $US bn (right scale) 
Percentage Share of Retail and Institutional MMMF assets (left scale) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4A  
MMMF Assets and the Federal Funds Rate: 1975-2013 
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Figure 5A 
US Commercial paper Issuance: 2004-2009 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6A  
US ABCP supply by region  
 
Source: Moody’s Investor Services 
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Figure 7A.  
European holdings of foreign long term-debt securities 
 
 
 
Source: Bertaut et.al. (2012) 
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Table 1A Conduits contain in the sample  
 
 
 
 
 
Conduit name Sponsor bank Location 
Aeltus CBO V, Limited Aeltus Investment Management, Inc. / Chase Manhattan Bank US
Albis Capital Corporation Glencore AG / JPMorgan Chase Bank US
Amoco Managers Acceptance Corporation Amoco Oil Corporation / Chase Manhattan Bank US
Anglesea Funding LLC / Anglesea Funding PLC Bank of New York US
APRECO Incorporated Citibank, N.A. US
Aquifer Funding, LLC / Aquifer Funding Limited Bank of America N.A. US
Asset Portfolio Funding Corporation JPMorgan Chase Bank US
BA Emerald Notes Program Bank of America, N.A. US
Beta Finance Incorporated Citibank International PLC US
Bishop's Gate Residential Mortgage Trust Cendant Mortgage Corporation / Bank One, N.A.
US
Blue Ridge Asset Funding Corporation Wachovia Bank, N.A. US
Broadhollow Funding, LLC American Home Mortgage Investment Corp.
US
Bunge Asset Funding Corporation Bunge International Ltd. / JPMorgan Chase Bank US
CAFCO, LLC Citibank, N.A. US
Capital One Multi-Asset Execution Trust Capital One Bank US
Catapult-PmX Funding, LLC Paramax Capital Markets LLC / LaSalle Bank National Association US
CC (USA) Incorporated Citibank International PLC US
Centauri Corporation/ CC (USA) Incorporated Citibank International PLC US
Centre Square Funding Corporation First Union National Bank US
Centric Capital Corporation Wachovia Bank, N.A. US
Chariot Funding LLC JPMorgan Chase Bank US
Charta Corporation Citibank, N.A. US
CharterMAC Certificate Trust I First Tennessee Bank, N.A. US
Ciesco, L.P. Citibank, N.A. US
Clipper Receivables Corporation State Street Bank and Trust Company US
Cobblestone Funding LLC Citigroup Global Markets US
Conduit Asset Backed Securities Company Limited Artesia Banking Corporation / Chase Manhattan Bank US
Corporate Asset Funding Company, Incorporated Citibank, N.A. US
Corporate Receivables Corporation Citibank, N.A. US
CRC Funding, LLC Citibank, N.A. US
CXC Incorporated Citibank, N.A. US
DAKOTA Certificate Program Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. US
Declaration Funding I, Limited Independence Fixed Income Associates, Inc. / Chase Manhattan Bank US
Deer Valley Funding Ltd. / Deer Valley Funding LLC Merrill Lynch Bank USA US
Delaware Funding Corporation Morgan Guaranty Trust US
DNA Finance Corporation Genentech Inc. / JPMorgan Chase Bank US
Dorada Finance Incorporated Citibank International PLC US
Eagle I CBO Limited Federated Investment Counseling / Bank of New York US
Emerald Certificates Program MBNA America Bank, N.A. US
Eminent Funding I, Limited TCW Group / Chase Manhattan Bank US
Enterprise Funding Corporation Bank of America, N.A. US
Eureka Securitization Plc/Incorporated Citibank, N.A. US
Fairway Finance Company LLC BMO Nesbitt Burns US
Falcon Asset Securitization Corporation Bank One, N.A. US
FCCII, Incorporated First National Bank of Omaha US
First Express Funding Corporation First Tennessee Bank, N.A. US
Five Finance Incorporated Citibank International PLC US
Forrestal Certificate Funding Trust Bank of America, N.A. US
Fountain Square Commercial Funding Corporation Fifth Third Bank US
Frigate Funding Corporation State Street Bank and Trust Company US
Galaxy Funding, Incorporated Firstar Bank, N.A. US
Galleon Capital Corporation State Street Bank and Trust Company US
Golden Funding Corporation System Capital Corporation / Chase Manhattan Bank US
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Table 1A (continued) Conduits contain in the sample 
 
 
 
 
Conduit name Sponsor bank Location 
Govco Incorporated Citibank, N.A. US
Grenadier Funding, Limited ACA Management, L.L.C. / JPMorgan Chase Bank US
Hatteras Funding Corporation Bank of America, N.A. US
Hudson Street Funding Corporation Goldman, Sachs & Co. US
Independence Funding LLC Bank of America, N.A. US
IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. - North Lake Capital Funding IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. US
Ivory Funding Corporation Bank One, N.A. US
Jupiter Securitization Corporation (formerly International Securitization Corporation)Bank O e, N.A. US
Jupiter Securitization Corp. JPMorgan Chase Bank US
Keel Capital Inc. / Spinnaker Capital Pty Limited State Street Global Markets LLC US
Kitty Hawk Funding Corporation Bank of America, N.A. US
KKR Pacific Funding Trust KKR Financial Advisors III / Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas US
KKR Atlantic Funding Trust KKR Financial Advisors III / Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas US
KZH-KMS Chase Manhattan Bank US
Lake Front Funding Company LLC Bank One, N.A. US
Liquid Funding Ltd. Bear Sterns Bank PLC US
Lockhart Funding LLC Zions First National Bank US
Luminent Star Funding Statutory Trust I Luminent Mortgage Capital Inc. /  LaSalle Bank N.A. US
Madison Funding Corporation Bank One, N.A. US
Market Street Funding Corporation PNC Bank, N.A. US
MOAT Funding  LLC Chase Manhattan Bank US
MPF Limited
Alliance Capital Management L.P. / State Street Bank and Trust 
Company US
MPF Two Limited
Alliance Capital Management L.P. / State Street Bank and Trust 
Company US
Newbury Funding CBO I Limited Colonial Advisory Services, Inc. / Bank of New York US
Newcastle Certificates Program Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co. US
North Coast Funding LLC National City Bank US
Ocala Funding LLC Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corporation / Lasalle Bank N.A. US
Old Slip Funding Corporation Bank of New York US
Panterra Funding, LLC Citibank, N.A. US
Park Avenue Receivables Company LLC JPMorgan Chase Bank US
Perry Funding Corporation, Series CAB & NJED Bank of America, N.A. US
Perry Global Funding Limited, Series A Bank of America, N.A. US
Perry Global Funding Limited, Series A & B Bank of America, N.A. US
Perry II Funding Corporation, Series Jersey, Hydro-Quebec 
(HQ), Quebec, & ACE
Bank of America, N.A.
US
Perry III Funding Corporation, Series Philadelphia & ROSE Bank of America, N.A.
US
Pooled Accounts Receivables Capital Corporation BMO Nesbitt Burns US
Preferred Receivables Funding Corporation Bank One, N.A. US
Providian Master Trust Series 1993-3 Providian National Bank US
Quincy Capital Corporation Bank of America, N.A. US
Ranger Funding Company LLC Bank of America, N.A. US
Receivables Capital Company LLC Bank of America, N.A. US
Receivables Capital Corporation Bank of America, N.A. US
Revolving Commitment Vehicle Corporation Morgan Guaranty Trust US
Sedna Finance Incorporated Citibank, N.A. US
Steamboat Funding Corporation Bank of New York US
Stellar Funding Corporation Firstar Bank, N.A. US
Sunbelt Funding Corporation Compass Bank US
Sweetwater Capital Corporation Mellon Bank US
Three Rivers Funding Corporation Mellon Bank US
Ticonderoga Funding, LLC / Ticonderoga Master Funding 
Ltd.
Bank of America, N.A.
US
Trainer Wortham First Republic CBO I, Limited Trainer, Wortham & Company, Inc. / Chase Manhattan Bank
US
Ullswater Corporation JPMorgan Chase Bank US
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Conduit name Sponsor bank Location 
Ultimate Finance Corporation (formerly Amoco Managers 
Acceptance Corporation)
Amoco Oil Corporation / JPMorgan Chase Bank
US
Variable Funding Capital Corporation Wachovia Bank, N.A. US
Venus Funding Corporation U.S. Bank National Association US
Vetra Finance Inc Citibank, N.A. US
Waratah Securities Australia Limited/ Sydney Capital Corp. Westpac Banking Corp. US
Waterfront Funding Corporation M&I Marshall & Ilsley Bank US
WCP Funding Incorporated Citibank, N.A. US
Westways Funding I, Limited TCW Group / JPMorgan Chase Bank US
Westways Funding II, Limited TCW Group / Chase Manhattan Bank US
Westways Funding III, Limited TCW Group / JPMorgan Chase Bank US
Westways Funding IV, Limited TCW Group / Chase Manhattan Bank US
Westways Funding V, Limited TCW Group / Chase Manhattan Bank US
White Pine Corporation Limited / White Pine Finance LLC Bank One, N.A. US
Yorktown Capital, LLC Bank of America, N.A. US
Zane Funding, LLC Merrill Lynch Bank USA US
Zela Finance Corporation / Zela Finance Inc Citibank International plc US
Beta Finance Corporation Citibank International PLC US
Capital USA Funding II, L.P. Capital USA, LLC US
Centauri Corporation Citibank International PLC US
Citibank Capital Markets Assets II LLC Citibank, N.A. US
Citibank Capital Markets Assets LLC Citibank, N.A. US
Dorada Corporation Citibank International PLC US
Five Finance Corporation Citibank International PLC US
Immunex Funding Corporation Immunex Corporation / JPMorgan Chase Bank US
Oasis Asset Management Limited Citibank International PLC US
Perry Global Funding Limited, Series  A & B Bank of America, N.A. US
Sandlot Funding LLC U.S. Central Federal Credit Union US
Wood Street Funding Corporation PNC Bank, N.A. US
Indomitable Funding Ltd. Bank of America, N.A. US
CPI Funding Corporation Lord Securities Corporation/ JPMorgan Chase Bank US
CentreStar Capital No.1, LLC National Australia Bank Limited Australia
Coast Asset Corporation ANZ Investment Bank Australia
Sydney Capital Corporation / Waratah Securities Australia 
Limited
Westpac Banking Corp.
Australia
Titan Securitisation Limited / TSL (USA) Inc. National Australia Bank Ltd. Australia
MTF Securities Limited Commonwealth Bank of Australia Australia
TSL (USA) Incorporated National Australia Bank Limited Australia
ABSC Capital Corporation, Incorporated Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Canada
Asset Securitization Cooperative Corporation Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Canada
Asset-Backed Securitisation Corporation Limited / ABSC 
Capital Corporation, Incorporated
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce
Canada
Exelsior Incorporated XL Capital / Royal Bank of Canada Canada
Liberty Street Funding Corporation Bank of Nova Scotia Canada
Links Finance Corporation / Links Finance LLC Bank of Montreal (London Branch) Canada
Old Line Funding Corporation Royal Bank of Canada Canada
Parkland Finance Corporation/ Parkland (USA) LLC Bank of Montreal (London Branch) Canada
SPARC, LLC Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Canada
Special Purpose Accounts Receivable Cooperative 
Corporation
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce
Canada
Superior Funding Capital Corporation Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Canada
Thunder Bay Funding Incorporated Royal Bank of Canada Canada
White Point Funding, Inc. Royal Bank of Canada, New York Branch Canada
Exelsior Finance Limited XL Capital / Royal Bank of Canada Canada
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Conduit name Sponsor bank Location 
Great Lakes Funding Capital Corporation Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Canada
Links Finance LLC Bank of Montreal (London Branch) Canada
A.M. Funding Corporation Credit Suisse First Boston Europe
ABEL Funding Pty. Limited/ Tasman Funding Incorporated ABN AMRO Australia Limited Europe
Abington Square Funding, LLC HSBC Bank PLC Europe
ACE Overseas Corporation Societe Generale Australia Limited Europe
Cobbler Funding Limited / Cobbler Funding LLC WestLB AG Europe
Ajax Bambino Funding Limited / Ajax Bambino Funding Inc. ING Bank N.V. Europe
Alpine Securitization Corporation Credit Suisse Europe
Altamira Funding LLC Banco Santander Central Hispano, S.A. Europe
Amstel Funding Corporation ABN AMRO Bank N.V. Europe
Amsterdam Funding Corporation ABN AMRO Bank N.V. Europe
Antalis S.A. / Antalis U.S. Funding Corp. Societe Generale Europe
Aquinas Funding LLC Rabobank Nederland Europe
AriesOne Metafolio Corporation Hudson Castle Group Inc. / Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas
Europe
Arth Capital Corporation Glencore AG / Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas
Europe
Aspen Funding Corporation Deutsche Bank AG Europe
Asscher Finance Limited HSBC Bank plc Europe
Atlantic Asset Securitization Corporation Credit Lyonnais Europe
Atlantis One Funding Corporation Rabobank Nederland Europe
Atlantis Two Funding Corporation Rabobank Nederland Europe
Atomium Funding LLC KBC Bank N.V. / JPMorgan Chase Bank Europe
Austra Corporation Société Générale Australia Limited Europe
Autobahn Funding Company LLC DG Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank AG Europe
Barton Capital Corporation Societe Generale Europe
Bavaria Finance Funding I LLC Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank AG Europe
Bavaria GLB Corporation Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank AG Europe
Bavaria TRR Corporation Bayerische Hypo - und Vereinsbank AG Europe
Bavaria Universal Funding Corporation Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank AG Europe
Beacon Funding Limited / Beacon Funding LLC HSH Nordsbank AG Europe
Beethoven Funding Corporation Dresdner Bank AG Europe
Berkeley Square Finance LLC / Berkeley Square Finance Ltd.Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas Europe
BEST Funding Limited Bankgesellschaft Berlin AG Europe
Black Forest Funding Corporation Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank AG Europe
BLUE SPICE, LLC Deutsche Bank AG Europe
Blue Topaz, LLC Deutsche Bank AG Europe
Brahms Funding Corporation Dresdner Bank AG Europe
Bryant Park Funding LLC HSBC Bank PLC Europe
Cable Beach L.P. Deutsche Bank AG Europe
Cancara Asset Securitisation LLC Lloyds TSB Bank PLC Europe
Cantabric Financing PLC / Cantabric Financing LLC Banco Santander Central Hispano, S.A. Europe
Carrera Capital Finance LLC / Carrera Capital Finance Ltd. HSH Nordbank AG / JP Morgan Chase Bank Europe
Certain Funding Corporation Societe Generale Europe
Check Point Charlie Incorporated Bankgesellschaft Berlin AG Europe
Classic LLC Calyon Europe
Cobbler Funding LLC / Cobbler Funding Limited Nationwide Building Society Europe
Compass Securitization LLC Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale Europe
Coral Capital Limited/ Coral Capital LLC DZ Bank AG Europe
Cullinan Finance Limited / Cullinan Finance Corporation HSBC Bank PLC Europe
Eaton Vance Variable Leverage Fund Ltd. Deutsche Bank AG Europe
Erasmus Capital Corporation Rabobank Nederland Europe
Four Winds Funding Corporation Commerzbank AG Europe
Fox Trot CDO Ltd. Rabobank Nederland Europe
Gemini Securitization Corporation LLC Deutsche Bank AG Europe
George Street Finance Pty Ltd./ George Street Finance LLC Royal Bank of Scotland PLC Europe
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Conduit name Sponsor bank Location 
Giro Balanced Funding Corporation Bayerische Landesbank Girozentrale Europe
Giro Funding U.S. Corporation Bayerische Landesbank Europe
Giro Lion Funding Limited Bayerische Landesbank Europe
Giro Multi-Funding Corporation Bayerische Landesbank Girozentrale Europe
Gramercy Capital Corporation Credit Suisse First Boston Europe
Grampian Funding LLC HBOS Treasury Services plc Europe
Grand Funding Corporation ABN AMRO Bank N.V. Europe
Grand II Funding Corporation ABN AMRO Bank N.V. Europe
Greenwich Funding Corporation Credit Suisse First Boston Europe
Greyhawk Funding LLC Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale Europe
Hannover Funding Company LLC Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale Europe
High Peak Funding LLC Erste Bank / Chase Manhattan Bank Europe
Hudson-American Realty Protection LLC Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank AG Europe
Jade Capital Corporation
Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank & Industrial Bank of Japan / Mizuho 
Trust & Banking Co., Ltd.
Europe
K2 (USA) LLC Dresdner Bank AG Europe
Kaiserplatz Funding Commerzbank AG Europe
KBC Commercial Paper Trust KBC Bank N.V. Europe
Kestrel Funding US LLC WestLB AG Europe
La Fayette Asset Securitization LLC Credit Lyonnais (New York Branch) Europe
Lake Constance Funding Ltd./ Lake Constance Funding LLC Landesbank Baden-Wuerttemburg Europe
Lakeside Funding LLC Deutsche Bank AG Europe
Landale Funding LLC HBOS Treasury Services plc Europe
LMA S.A. (Liquidités de Marché) Calyon Europe
Loch Ness Limited / Ness LLC Royal Bank of Scotland PLC Europe
Lone Star Funding LLC
Associates First Capital Corporation / Deutsche Bank Trust Company 
Americas Europe
Lyon Short Term Funding Corporation Credit Lyonnais Europe
Mane Funding Corporation ING Bank N.V. Europe
Maximilian Capital Corporation Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank AG (Singapore Branch)
Europe
Mermaid Funding Corporation Rabobank Nederland Europe
Monte Rosa Capital Corporation ING Bank N.V. Europe
Mica Funding, LLC
Stanfield Global Strategies LLC / Deutsche Bank Trust Company 
Americas Europe
Mont Blanc Capital Corporation ING Bank N.V. Europe
Montauk Funding Corporation Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale Europe
Monument Gardens Funding LLC Rabobank Nederland Europe
Moriarty Limited Abbey National Treasury Services PLC Europe
Ness LLC Royal Bank of Scotland Europe
Newport Funding Corporation Deutsche Bank AG Europe
Nieuw Amsterdam Receivables Corporation Rabobank Nederland Europe
Nightwatch Funding LLC ABN AMRO Bank N.V. Europe
North Sea Funding LLC ABN AMRO Bank N.V. Europe
Orchid Funding Corporation ABN AMRO Bank N.V. Europe
Granite Funding LLC Ceres Capital LLC / Bankers Trust Company
Europe
FIDEX PLC BNP Paribas Europe
Eiger Capital Corporation ING Bank N.V. Europe
Paradigm Funding LLC WestLB AG Europe
Peacock Funding Corporation Credit Suisse First Boston Europe
Pennine Funding LLC Halifax PLC Europe
Picaros Funding plc / Picaros Funding LLC KBC Bank N.V. / KBC Financial Products UK Limited Europe
Polonius, Incorporated Danske Bank Europe
Premier Asset Collateralized Entity Limited / Premier Asset 
Collateralized Entity LLC
Société Générale
Europe
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Conduit name Sponsor bank Location 
Premier Cru Funding Corporation ABN AMRO Bank N.V. Europe
Public Square Funding LLC, Series I Key Bank, N.A. / Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas Europe
Public Square Funding LLC, Series II Key Bank, N.A. / Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas Europe
Regency Markets No. 1 LLC HSBC Investment Bank PLC Europe
Repeat Offering Securitisation Entity Funding Incorporated (ROSE)National Westminster Bank PLC Europe
Rhein-Main Securitisation Limited Deutsche Bank AG Europe
Rheingold Securitisation Limited Deutsche Bank AG Europe
Rhineland Funding Capital Corporation IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG / Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Europe
Romulus Funding Corporation IntesaBci S.p.A. / JPMorgan Chase Bank Europe
Rosy Blue International S.A. KBC Bank N.V. / JPMorgan Chase Bank (London Branch) Europe
Saratoga Funding Corp. LLC Deutsche Bank AG Europe
Scaldis Capital Limited / Scaldis Capital LLC Fortis Bank S.A./N.V. Europe
Sceptre International Incorporated Barclays Bank PLC Europe
Sedona Capital Funding Corporation Deutsche Bank AG Europe
Sheffield Receivables Corporation Barclays Bank PLC Europe
Silver Tower Funding Limited / Silver Tower US Funding LLC Dresdner Bank AG Europe
Silver Tower US Funding LLC Dresdner Bank AG Europe
Simba Funding Corp/Simba Funding Corp. (US) ING Bank N.V. Europe
Solitaire Funding Limited HSBC Bank PLC Europe
Stanfield Victoria Funding, LLC Stanfield Global Strategies, LLC / Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas Europe
Starbird Funding Corporation (formerly Global Receivables 
Corporation)
BNP Paribas
Europe
Stratford Receivables Company LLC Barclays Bank PLC Europe
Sunflowers Funding Corporation LLC ABN AMRO Bank N.V. Europe
Surrey Funding Corporation Barclays Bank PLC Europe
Tahoe Funding Corporation Deutsche Bank AG Europe
Tango Finance Limited/ Tango Finance Corporation Rabobank Nederland Europe
Tasman Funding Incorporated ABN AMRO Bank N.V. Europe
Tempo Finance Limited / Tempo Finance Corporation Rabobank International Europe
Thames Asset Global Securitization No. 1, Incorporated National Westminster Bank PLC Europe
Three Crowns Funding LLC Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB Europe
Times Square Funding, LLC Eurohypo AG, New York Branch Europe
Trident Capital Finance Incorporated Société Générale Europe
Tulip Funding Corporation / Tulip Euro Funding Corporation ABN AMRO Bank N.V. Europe
Whistlejacket Capital Ltd. / Whistlejacket Capital LLC Standard Chartered Bank Europe
Windmill Funding Corporation ABN AMRO Bank N.V. Europe
Bills Securitisation Limited Deutsche Bank AG Europe
Certain Funding Limited Societe Generale Europe
Citation Capital Incorporated Deutsche Bank AG / Bankers Trust Company Europe
Compass Securitisation Limited Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale Europe
Eliopée Limited BNP Paribas Europe
K2 Corporation Dresdner Bank AG Europe
Nantucket Funding Corp., LLC Deutsche Bank AG Europe
Ormond Quay Funding PLC Sachsen LB Europe plc Europe
Scaldis Capital Limited Fortis Bank S.A./N.V. Europe
Silver Tower Funding Limited Dresdner Bank AG Europe
TempUS Funding LLC Rabobank International, New York Branch Europe
Twin Towers Incorporated Deutsche Bank AG Europe
Viking Asset Securitisation Limited Unibank A/S Europe
Arabella Funding Ltd. Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank AG Europe
Bavaria Securitisation Limited Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank AG Europe
Ebbets Funding LLC / Ebbets Funding Plc Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas Europe
Fenway Funding, LLC Hudson Castle Group Inc. / Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas Europe
Harrier Finance Limited / Harrier Finance (US) Limited WestLB AG Europe
Albion Capital Corporation S.A. Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Japan
Broadway Capital Corporation Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd. Japan
Dynamic Funding Corporation Fuji Bank, Limited Japan
Golden Fish Limited/ Golden Fish LLC Norinchukin Bank Japan
Gotham Funding Corporation Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd. Japan
Manhattan Asset Funding Company LLC Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation / Bankers Trust Company Japan
Parthenon Receivables Funding LLC Swiss Re Financial Products & Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd. Japan
Victory Receivables Corporation Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd. / Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas Japan
Working Capital Management Co., L.P. Industrial Bank of Japan Japan
Golden Fish LLC Norinchukin Bank Japan
Strategic Asset Funding Corporation (SAFCO), Tranche B Sanwa Bank / Toyo Trust Company of New York Japan
Working Capital Management Co. II Industrial Bank of Japan Japan
